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T he Invisible Empire of the Knights of the Ku Klux Klan was in 
numbers and political influence the most powerful social movement 
of the 1920s and probably the most significant crusade of the 
American right-wing. Unlike its predecessor of the Reconstruction period 
or its descendant of today, this Klan movement was not primarily southern, 
white supremacist, or terrorist. Preaching a multifaceted program based 
upon “ 1 0 0  Percent Americanism” and militant Protestantism, the secret 
society enlisted recruits in every section of the nation. Among the strongest 
Klan organizations were the invisible realms of the West— Colorado, Texas, 
California, and Oregon. Perhaps as many as six million Americans heeded 
its call to resist Catholics, Jews, law violators, blacks, and immigrants. 
The Klan’s means of resistance were usually political—the election of 
trusted men who would assail criminals and regulate minority groups. 
Boycotts, cross burnings, and night riding tactics were also employed to 
remind minorities of their place.
One of the many questions about the Klan which remains unresolved 
concerns the socioeconomic character of the membership. Who joined 
the Ku Klux Klan? Was the Klan a movement of a particular social 
and economic class? Do popular stereotypes of Klan members approximate 
reality? Such questions are critical because determining which men joined 
will not only place the movement in sharper focus but enhance our under­
standing of why they joined. Almost every scholar concurs with sociologist 
John Mecklin’s observation that the vast majority of Klansmen were “con­
ventional Americans, thoroughly human, kind fathers and husbands, hos­
pitable to the stranger. . . .’n Consensus, however, ends at this point.
Robert A. Goldberg is assistant professor of history, University of Texas at San 
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1 John Moffatt Mecklin, The Ku Klux Klan: A Case Study of the American Mind 
(New York, 1924), 96.
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Mecklin, an early and perceptive student of the organization, considered 
the Klan a movement of the “well-meaning but more or less ignorant 
and unthinking middle class. .  . .”2 It included, he added, “in many in­
stances the best citizens of the community.”3 Journalist Stanley Frost, 
also writing in the 1920s, agreed: “They are usually the good, solid, 
middle-class citizens, the ‘backbone of the nation’.”4 In Oklahoma, town 
merchants and professionals, rather than poor farmers and tenants joined 
the secret society. Seventy-three Pennsylvania Exalted Cyclopses swore 
under oath in 1927 that the rank and file were “gleaned from the average 
walk of life and such as composes our Protestant churches, our lodges, 
commercial clubs, and other civic organizations.”5
The Klan’s economic and social respectability has been challenged 
with qualitative and quantitative data which portray the organization’s 
membership as overwhelmingly lower middle and working class. While 
it is conceded that prominent men did appear in the klavem hall initially, 
they were among the first to defect when the Klan swelled with members 
of lesser rank. Allegedly, Klan violence and blatant appeals to prejudice 
repelled the better-educated professionals and businessmen. Seymour Lip- 
set inferred, “As a simplistic moralistic bigoted movement, the Klan 
increasingly became a movement of the less educated and less privileged 
strata. . .  .”6 Frederick Lewis Allen dismissed the Klan as a product of 
“the less educated and less disciplined elements of the white Protestant 
community.”7 Norman Weaver’s investigation of the Detroit Klan re­
vealed that southern whites, threatened by black competition for jobs and 
homes, were especially receptive to the secret society’s appeals.8 The 
Middletown Klan, remarked Helen and Robert Lynd, was “largely a 
working class movement.”9 Kenneth T. Jackson’s The K u Klux Klan in 
the City, 1915-1930  strongly bolsters the marginal man-low status argu­
2 Ibid., 103.
3 Ibid., 96.
4 Stanley Frost, The Challenge of the Klan (Indianapolis, 1924), 2.
5 Garin Burbank, “Agrarian Radicals and Their Opponents: Political Conflict in 
Southern Oklahoma,” Journal of American History, LV III (June 1971), 18-19; Emer­
son Hunsberger Loucks, The Ku Klux Klan in Pennsylvania: A Study in Nativism 
(Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, 1936), 60.
6 Seymour Martin Lipset and Earl Raab, The Politics of Unreason: Right-Wing 
Extremism in America, 1790—1970 (New York, 1970), 125.
7 Frederick Lewis Allen, Only Yesterday (New York, 1931), 56.
8 Norman F. Weaver, “The Knights of the Ku Klux Klan in Wisconsin, Indiana, 
Ohio, and Michigan” (doctoral dissertation, University of Wisconsin, 1954), 285.
9 Robert S. Lynd and Helen Merrell Lynd, Middletown (New York, 1929), 482.
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ment. His analysis of Klan membership lists and chapter records from 
six cities and towns demonstrated:
White-collar workers in general provided a substantial minority of Klan 
membership and included primarily struggling independent businessmen, 
advertising dentists^ lawyers, and chiropractors, ambitious and unprincipled 
politicians and salesmen, and poorly paid clerks. The greatest source of Klan 
support came from rank and file nonunion^ blue-collar employees of large 
businesses and factories. Miserably paid, they rarely boasted of as much as 
a high school education and more commonly possessed only a grammar or 
“free school” background.10
Proponents of the low-status view augment their position by quoting the 
Klan’s second Imperial Wizard, Hiram Wesley Evans: “We are a move­
ment of the plain people, very weak in the matter of culture, intellectual 
support and trained leadership. . . . This is undoubtedly a weakness. It 
lays us open to the charge of being ‘hicks’ and ‘rubes’ and ‘drivers of 
second-hand Fords.’ We admit it.”11 Contemporary opponents of the Klan 
agreed, although their motives may be more suspect. Also offered in evi­
dence is the frequently quoted observer of an Indiana Klan demonstra­
tion: “You think the influential men belong here? Then look at their 
shoes when they march in parade. The sheet doesn’t cover the shoes.”12
A third hypothesis, rarely made explicit, has also been suggested. 
A few students of the Klan have interpreted the organization’s hetero­
geneous program as a mirror of the membership. The Klan offered a 
platform of Americanism, militant Protestantism, fraternity, law and order, 
religious intolerance, and racial purity — a plethora of causes from which 
a wide variety of men could choose. Charles Alexander, while accepting 
the middle class explanation, concluded from his study of the Klans in 
the Southwest that “excluding nonwhites and non-Protestants, the mem­
bership of the order was remarkably cross-sectional. Bankers, businessmen* 
salesmen, physicians, lawyers, ministers, and even university professors 
donned their white robes and hoods alongside mechanics, farmers, and 
day laborers. The Klan had something for them all.”13
10 Kenneth T. Jackson, The Ku Klux Klan in the City, 1915-1930 (New York, 
1967), 240-41.
11 Hiram Wesley Evans, “The Klan’s Fight for Americanism,” North American 
Review, CCXXIII (March 1926), 49.
12 Allen, Only Yesterday, 56.
13 Charles C. Alexander, The Ku Klux Klan in the Southwest (Lexington, Ken­
tucky, 1966), 18-19.
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Denver provides an unparalleled opportunity to probe these varying 
and conflicting conceptions. During the 1920s, Denver was the financial 
and commercial center of the Rocky Mountain West, unchallenged in a 
wide trade area extending for 500 miles in all directions. Denver had 
been founded in 1858 and first served as an outfitting station for miners 
seeking their fortunes in the mountains. With the building of the railroads 
and the settlement of the plains, the city had expanded to supply the 
needs of farmers and cattle ranchers. Denver was primarily a distribution 
and collection point and never developed substantial heavy industry. 
Manufacturing was diversified, small scale, and oriented toward local and 
regional markets. Only 28 percent of the labor force was employed in 
manufacturing, slightly less than the number engaged in trade and trans­
portation. The city’s 256,000 residents were predominantly white and 
Protestant. Only 6,175 blacks, 37,748 Catholics, and 17,000 Jews made 
their homes in the community. The Ku Klux Klan came to Denver in 
the spring of 1921. Within three years the organization had gathered 
nearly 17,000 members and sufficient political strength to capture control 
of the municipal government. Klan leaders were able to build the state’s 
strongest organization because they responded to the grievances of Denver 
Protestants confronted with an actual breakdown in law and order and 
challenges from minority groups. With city officials seemingly unrespon­
sive, the Klan solution became for many, the only solution. Using lodge, 
social, and professional connections, Klansmen first contacted Denver’s 
public officials, Protestant ministers, and leading businessmen. Later, in 
preparation for political action, the Klan broadened its base and wel­
comed all who sought to enlist. Klan recruiting, after an initial encounter 
with government authorities, met only scattered resistance. Following a 
few skirmishes, the path was cleared toward the goal of dictating commu­
nity policy. The secret society’s grip upon Denver became so sure that 
city officials made no effort to deny hooded affiliations, movement leaders’ 
names and pictures appeared in the newspapers, and the order frequently 
requisitioned men and vehicles from the police department.14
Among the artifacts which have survived the movement are the 
names of the Exalted Cyclops’ chief lieutenants and Klan leaders elected 
in 1924, 1925, and 1926; the official Roster of Members of the Denver
14 Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Fourteenth Census of the 
United States, Population, 1920: General Report and Analytical Tables (11 vols., 
Washington, D.C., 1921—23), II, 47, 49, 52; Department of Commerce, Bureau of the 
Census, Census of Religious Bodies: 1926 (2 vols., Washington, D.C., 1930), I, 406—7; 
Robert A. Goldberg, “Hooded Empire: The Ku Klux Klan in Colorado, 1921-1932” 
(doctoral dissertation, University of Wisconsin, 1977), 14—63.
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klavem; and the 1924 Membership Applications Book. These unique 
sources open the Klan membership to analysis. To test the long-held 
observation that early joining Klansmen differed in socioeconomic status 
from late joiners, the 16,727 knights listed on the roster were divided 
into three groups: those recruited before January 1923, those between 
January 1923 and May 1924, and those after May 1924. January 1923 
was chosen as an end date for the early joiner group because it closely 
approximated the Klan’s shift from its formative stage to a more aggressive 
and open involvement in the community. Membership in the early joiner 
group was determined by examining newspapers, city directories, death 
certificates, and the resignation, suspension, and banishment dates entered 
in the roster. The total early joiner population was 1,000 men, from which 
two names were excluded —  one a duplicate and the other a newspaper 
spy. Those men entering tlie Klan after May 1924 were designated late 
joiners. This division was based upon the Denver Klan’s decision to open 
its rolls and launch a major membership drive at the end of May 1924 
in preparation for a mayoral recall election. The Membership Applica­
tions Book records the names of 13,353 prospective Klansmen and their 
dates of application from May 27, 1924, to the end of the year. Appli­
cants’ names were matched to those appearing in the roster to set the 
beginning number for the late joiners. More than 1,200 applicants failed 
to follow up their initial commitment. Also included in the late joiner 
population were 1,550 men who enlisted in 1925. The late joiners thus 
numbered 13,735, from which seven duplicate or spys’ names were 
excluded. Three hundred and seventy-five men were randomly selected 
from the early joiner population of 998 and 583 men from the 13,728 
late joiners. No sample was taken from the group joining between Janu­
ary 1923 and May 1924 because the data accumulated would have had 
little bearing upon the hypothesis under consideration. With a confidence 
level of 95 percent and confidence interval of plus or minus 4 percent, 
a sample of 375 is acceptable for a population of 1,000 and 583 for 
20,000. Thus, if an indefinitely large number of samples of size 375 or 
583 were drawn, the results from 95 percent of these samples would be 
within 4 percent of the “true” values of the two populations.16
15 The list of leaders is complete for 1924, and only the Klexter and Kligrapp 
are unknown for 1926. Most of the names appeared in the Denver Express, April 1,
1924, and May 11, 1926. The other men were either elected leaders in 1925 or members 
of the Exalted Cyclops’ unofficial inner circle. Their names were gathered from a variety 
of Klan documents and newspapers. Some Klan leaders held more than one office while 
members. For example, Reverend William Oeschger was Klaliff in 1924 and Exalted 
Cyclops in 1925 ; Walter Dubree served consecutive terms as Klokan.
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Information about each Klansman was extracted from city directo­
ries, vital statistics records, obituaries, biographical dictionaries, military 
records, and membership lists of various fraternal, civic, and social groups. 
The resulting collective biography of the 36 leaders and 958 sample Klan 
members not only produces a sharper socioeconomic picture of tlie move­
ment but sheds light upon their reasons for joining.
The Klan owed much of its success in Denver to the men who 
shaped its local identity and charted the course to power. Who were 
the leaders of Denver Klan #1 ?  What were the backgrounds of those 
who represented the rank and file, eased factional wrangling, and set 
priorities upon resource distribution? Age and place of birth information 
were gathered for twenty-five of the thirty-six leaders. Klan officers ranged 
in age from 21 to 67 years with a mean age of 42.4 years. Although 
men in all age groups appeared in the hierarchy, those in the 30 to 39 
years (10) and 50 years and older (8) brackets were overrepresented 
and those in their 20s (2) were underrepresented when compared to 
Denver’s native white male population. While every section of the United 
States except the Pacific Coast region contributed to the leadership, the 
largest blocs of Klansmen were born in the Middle Atlantic states (5) 
and Colorado (6).  The sizes of the birthplaces of twenty-one men are 
known and are primarily towns with a population of 2,500 or less (9) 
or cities of 100,000 or more people (7).  Military service data, available 
for three-quarters of the men, indicate that twenty never served in the 
armed forces, one was a Spanish-American War veteran, and four had 
participated in World War I. It is surprising, considering the youth of 
many of the leaders, that so few had served in 1917-1918. The Klan’s
In 1946, an anonymous Denver Klansman gave Rocky Mountain News reporter 
Lee Casey the Klan’s Roster of Members and Membership Applications Book. Casey 
subsequently donated the material to the State Historical Society of Colorado, where it 
remained closed to researchers until 1975. The men listed in the roster book bear num­
bers from 501 to 47,802. Actually, there are only 16,727 Klansmen recorded. Large gaps 
between numbers inflated the totals, perhaps to impress members with the strength of 
the organization. Along with the names, residential and business addresses are listed. 
Members with Denver business addresses and suburban residences were assigned to the 
Denver Klan. The decision to open the membership rolls is revealed in the District 
Attorney Philip Van Cise Spy Reports, May 12, 19, 1924, Ku Klux Klan Collection, 
Western History Department, Denver Public Library. The applications book contains 
notes which indicate some of the reasons for the failure of more than 1,200 prospective 
members to follow through: “Says he can’t go on account of family,” “Bootlegger,” 
and “Short Residence.” Herbert Arkin and Raymond R. Colton, comps., Tables for 
Statisticians (New York, 1963), 145 (Table 20).
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leaders were mostly married men, with only four remaining single and one 
divorced.16
Information concerning length of residence and fraternal affiliations 
also reflects sharp contrasts. Klan officers resided an average of 14.5 
years in Denver before joining. The figure, however, is misleading and 
hides considerable variation. Eight of the leaders were recent arrivals, 
having lived in the community three years or less. At the other extreme, 
long-time residents in Denver, eighteen years or more, constituted one-third 
of the group. Over two-thirds of the leaders resided in the city for seven 
years or more. Eighteen, or half of the leaders, had no fraternal member­
ship in a lodge other than the Ku Klux Klan. All but one of the rest 
belonged to two or more fraternal orders. Of those with multiple mem­
berships, fifteen were Masons, eleven Knight Templars, and eight Odd 
Fellows. Klansmen were, in addition, active in the Elks, Lions, and Wood­
men of the World. The city’s elite clubs, such as the Denver Club, Denver 
Country Club, Cherry Hills Country Club, Lakewood Country Club, 
and University Club, had no Klan leaders among their members. Four 
Klan officers belonged to the Denver Athletic Club, which was one level 
below these organizations. Only one Klan leader was listed in the social 
register. Three of the five men eligible were members of either the 
American Legion or the Veterans of Foreign Wars.17
16 The breakdown of regions by state was taken from the U.S. Census and is as 
follows: NEW ENGLAND — Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, 
Rhode Island, Vermont; MIDDLE ATLANTIC — New Jersey, New York, Pennsyl­
vania; EAST NORTH CENTRAL — Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Ohio, Wisconsin; 
WEST NORTH CENTRAL — Iowa, Kansas, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, North 
Dakota, South Dakota; SOUTH ATLANTIC — Delaware, District of Columbia, 
Florida, Georgia, Maryland, North Carolina, South Carolina, Virginia, West Virginia : 
EAST SOUTH CENTRAL — Alabama, Kentucky, Mississippi, Tennessee; WEST 
SOUTH CENTRAL — Arkansas, Louisiana, Oklahoma, Texas; MOUNTAIN — 
Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Utah, Wyoming; PACIFIC 
— California, Oregon, Washington.
17 Klan leaders were located in the Denver City Directory and traced backward 
at three-year intervals, from 1925 to 1901. Years of residence is the minimum possible 
residential period because of time gaps between directories and exclusion resulting from 
error or youth. In every case possible, information from other sources was used to 
confirm residential period.
The complete membership rosters of the American Legion, Cherry Hills Country 
Club, Denver Athletic Club, Denver Chamber of Commerce, Denver Club, Denver 
Country Club, Knight Templars, Lakewood Country Club, Lions’ Club, Rotary Club, 
United Spanish-American War Veterans, University Club, and the Veterans of Foreign 
Wars were checked for Klan leaders. Biographic dictionaries, obituaries, and other 
miscellaneous sources were used to supplement an incomplete list of Denver Masons 
and to provide data about Eagle, Eastern Star, Knights of Pythias, Elk, Moose, Odd
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Although the Klan leaders differed considerably as to age, length of 
residence, and number of fraternal ties, they showed striking similarity in 
occupational status. Twenty-six of the men held occupations in the two 
highest status groups. Only three men were engaged in manual labor. 
The most frequently occurring occupations were small businessman (8),  
clergyman (4), lawyer (4),  manager of a firm (4), and physician (3).  
When compared to the occupational distribution for all male Denverites, 
Klansmen in the high and middle nonmanual categories are vastly over­
represented (72 percent as contrasted to 19.2 percent) and all other 
groups decidedly underrepresented. Unfortunately, the census does not 
provide the data necessary to compare Klan leaders to the native-born 
white male population. The men’s occupational histories before joining 
the Klan indicate that twelve were upwardly mobile, eleven were in the 
same status group as when they first entered the Denver work force, and 
only one was downwardly mobile. There is little change in these totals 
when considering occupations held while Klansmen. For some of the men, 
high occupational status may well have counteracted the detrimental ef­
fects of short-term residence and youth upon their chances of joining the 
Klan hierarchy.18
Thus, just a rung below the city’s elite, the leaders of the Denver 
Klan were sufficiently attractive — socially and economically — to draw 
recruits. They were primarily business and professional men whose sobriety 
and respectability shielded the Klan from charges of irresponsibility and 
radicalism. Skillfully they exploited lodge and business contacts to lure 
like-minded men of similar status. As they did, the Klan’s reputation 
was further enhanced. Middle-aged, often with families, they were models
Fellows, Shrine, and Woodmen of the World memberships. Because lists for these groups 
were not complete, affiliation statistics are minimum numbers. See also Social Record 
and Club Annual XVII (Denver, 1924), 121-54.
18 The occupations given are those listed in the Denver City Directory for 1922 
(early joiners) and 1925 (late joiners). The socioeconomic classification of occupa­
tion employed in this study is a modification of the rankings made by Alba Edwards, 
A Social-Economic Grouping of the Gainful Workers of the United States: 1930 
(Washington, D.C., 1938). Other sources helpful in formulating the occupational 
classification scheme were Peter M. Blau and Otis Dudley Duncan, The American 
Occupational Structure (New York, 1967) ; George S. Counts, “The Social Status of 
Occupations: A Problem in Vocational Guidance,” The School Review, XXXIII 
(January 1925), 16-27; Albert J. Reiss, Jr., Occupations and Social Status (New 
York, 1961); Stephan Themstrom, The Other Bostonians: Poverty and Progress in 
the American Metropolis, 1880-1970 (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1973).
Interestingly, although the educational histories of only one-third (13) of the 
men are known, six, or 17 percent, had received degrees from professional or graduate 
schools.
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of decorum —  quite convincing in the parental fears they voiced for the 
future of Denver’s youth. The Denver Klan’s advantage was obvious — 
their leaders not only looked the part, they acted it.
“They came from City Hall and from the suburbs,” observed a 
D enver Express reporter stationed outside a Klan meeting. “Tall, short, 
young and old —  some well-dressed by tailors and some from Curtis 
Street second-hand stores.”19 At least visually the Klan rank and file ap­
peared as a heterogeneous aggregation. What do the socioeconomic data 
collected for the early and late joiner Klan samples indicate?
The Denver Klan was an organization of mature men and not the 
young. The mean age of early joiners upon entering the Klan was 39.8 
and did not differ significantly from the late joiners at 37.8 years (Table 
1). The late joiners —  30 to 39 years of age — constituted over 40 per­
cent of their group. Similar proportions of men in their 40s and those 
over 50 belonged to each Klan group, with the sharpest difference occur­
ring in the 30 to 39 years of age bracket. The late joiners in almost every 
category more closely resembled the city’s native white population. With 
85 percent of the early joiners and 75 percent of the late joiners 30 years 
or older, the movement was hardly an uprising of callow, thrill-seeking 
young people. Stability is also reflected in marital status statistics. More 
than 75 percent of both groups were married, 22 percent single, and only
Table 1: Age Distribution of Denver Klansmen, Denver Colorado, 
1921-1925, Compared with the Age Distribution of Denver’s 
Native White Male Population in 1920 
(Twenty Years and Older) by Percent
Early Late Native White Male
Age Joiners Joiners Population
Under 20 1.4
20-29 15.5 23.4 30.0
30-39 41.4 29.4 26.5
40-49 24.1 24.8 20.1
50 and older 19.0 20.9 23.4
Total 244 286
Source: Sample data; Bureau of the Census, Fourteenth Census of the United States, 
Population, 1920, II, 308.
ly Denver Express, April 1, 1924.
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1 percent divorced. These figures compared to 58 percent married, 30 
percent single, and 2 percent divorced of the adult male population.20
The Midwest, not the South, was the Klan’s chief spawning ground. 
Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Missouri, and the rest of the states of the east 
north central and west north central regions furnished the bulk of Den­
ver’s Klan population (Table 2). Although one-third of Denver was 
native to the state, Colorado-born Klansmen comprised less than a fourth 
of the two sample groups. This discrepancy, however, might only reflect 
the inclusion of children eighteen years and younger in the census figures 
for Denver. Curiously, one man born in England, one in Ireland, and 
two in Germany appeared in the sample. All four were long-time residents 
and were probably granted admission because of friendship or deceit. 
Information regarding the size of birthplaces for one-third of the late
Table 2: Distribution of Birthplaces of Denver Klansmen,
Denver, Colorado. 1921-1925, Compared with the 
Distribution of Birthplaces of Denver’s Native 








New England 3.3 1.0 2.2
Middle Atlantic 8.3 6.4 9.0
East North Central 23.0 25.3 19.3
West North Central 24.0 34.2 21.3
South Atlantic 5.0 4.0 2.5
East South Central 5.8 5.0 3.6




Colorado 23.0 22.6 35.2
Pacific .3 1.1
Foreign Bom .8 .4
Total 241 283
Source: Sample data; Bureau of the Census, Fourteenth Census of the United States, 
Population, 1920, II, 666.
20 Bureau of the Census, Fourteenth Census of the United States, Population, 
1920, II, 479. Because the Klan only admitted those over eighteen years of age, married 
males in the Census* fifteen to nineteen years of age category were excluded from 
consideration. Census statistics do not total 100 percent.
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joiners (201) and one-half of the early joiners (183) reveals a rural and 
small-town background. Over 50 percent of the late joiners and 45 per­
cent of the early joiners were bom in or near towns with a population of 
2,500 or less, 66 percent and 62 percent, respectively, in towns of 10,000 
or less. Fewer than one-fourth of the late joiners and one-fifth of the 
early joiners were bom in cities of 100,000 or more.
An overwhelming majority of both early and late joiners never served 
in America’s wars. When the unknown category is disregarded, two-thirds 
of the early joiners (154) and three-quarters of the later arrivals (203) 
stayed home during wartime. Seventy-three, or 32 percent, of the early 
joiners entered the sendee in 1917 and one man in 1898. The figures 
for late joiners are even lower: sixty-five men, or 24 percent, served in 
World War I and one man during the Spanish-American War. In the 
1920s, few Klansmen shared their military experiences in either the 
American Legion or the Veterans of Foreign Wars, comprising just 2 
percent and 4 percent of the memberships, respectively. In the ranks, as 
in the leadership, recently discharged military veterans were noticeably 
absent. Missing past crusades to save American freedom and democracy, 
perhaps many saw the Klan as a means to compensate for lost opportuni­
ties to serve.
A striking contrast between early and late joiners appears in regard 
to membership in fraternities other than the Klan. Seventy-six percent 
(447) of the late joining Klansmen had no known fraternal ties. Of the 
remaining 136 men, forty-three, or 7 percent, belonged to two or more 
lodges. Forty-eight percent of the early joiners had no known fraternal 
ties, but 34 percent were members of two or more orders. The Masons 
provided a second fraternal home for 85 percent of the early joining Klans­
men and 79 percent of the late joiners with at least one lodge tie. Klans­
men also appeared in the ranks of the Knight Templars, Rotarians, Lions, 
Elks, and Odd Fellows but in much smaller numbers. Denver’s elite clubs 
listed only a handful of Klansmen among their members. The Denver 
Athletic Club contained the most — forty Klansmen, or 3 percent, of its 
total membership. The notion that early joiners tended to have more 
fraternal affiliations than late joiners is supported by gamma (+ .5 6 ) ,  
a measure of association. These differences reflect changes in the methods 
of recruiting between the Klan's arrival and the stage of intensive orga­
nizing. Early in the Klan period, the lodge was a prime site for contacting 
non-Klansmen. Later, as the saturation point was reached in the lodge 
room, other recruiting techniques were brought into play. A changing 
membership also indicated a transition in the Klan’s meaning and appeal.
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Klansmen were both long-time residents and recent migrants to the 
city. Early joiners resided in Denver an average 13.5 years as compared 
to 9.5 years for the late joiners (Table 3). Thirty-one percent of the 
early joiners and 20 percent of the later members resided in Denver 
eighteen years or more. Fifty-three percent of the later joiners as opposed 
to 37 percent of the early joiners lived in Denver six years or less; 49 per­
cent to 27 percent, three years or less. The visible impression that early 
joiners tended to reside in Denver for longer periods is supported by 
Pearson’s coefficient of contingency (.53).
Table 3: Length of Residence of Denver Klansmen, Denver, Colorado, 
1921-1925 (Prior to Joining)
Early Joiners Late Joiners
Years N Percent N Percent
1-3 99 27 242 41
4-6 39 10 73 12
7-9 17 5 40 7
10-13 46 12 28 5
14-17 35 9 53 9
18 and over 117 31 114 20
Unknown 22 6 33 6
Total 375 583
Source: Denver City Directory.
These fraternal and residential data bear directly upon the hy­
pothesis of mass society theorists which ties social movement activism to a 
weakened network of community groups. According to Lipset, the ranks 
of extremist movements are filled with “marginal men”— “the personal 
failures, the socially isolated, the economically insecure, the uneducated, 
unsophisticated and authoritarian persons at every level of society.”21 
Sociologist William Komhauser contends, “within all strata, people di­
vorced from community, occupation, and association are first and fore­
most among the supporters of extremism. The decisive social process in 
mass society is the atomization of social relations; even though this process 
is accentuated in the lower strata, it operates throughout society.”22
21 Seymour Martin Lipset, Political Man: The Social Base of Politics (New York, 
1959), 178.
22 William Kornhauser, The Politics of Mass Society (Glencoe, Illinois, 1959), 73.
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Early joiner information demonstrates, however, that rather than being 
divorced from social groups, nearly 20 percent were involved in outside 
organizational affairs and over one-third were thoroughly enmeshed. It is 
important to bear in mind for both early and late joiners that these 
figures are conservative because of the unavailability of complete fraternal 
membership rosters. Probably, many affiliations remain uncovered. The 
existing evidence indicates that the majority of early Klan recruits were 
approached through Denver’s network of civic, social, and fraternal orga­
nizations. These fraternal and social connections appear to have acceler­
ated the movement’s early momentum. On the other hand, a large per­
centage of early and late joiners seem to fit the mass society stereotype 
of uprooted and marginal men. Short-term residence and isolation from 
community affairs did cause many to see the secret order as a beacon 
of security and stability in an unpredictable environment. But, too much 
emphasis should not be placed upon what was actually an insignificant 
and uninfluential minority. Men usually joined the Klan at the urgings 
of lodge brothers, relatives, or close business associates. Applicants were 
required to complete a detailed, personal information questionnaire 
which included the names of five references, preferably Klansmen. Em­
ployer and peer pressure, not a lack of self-esteem, carried others into the 
order. The Klan could also serve as a conduit into the larger community. 
In the klavem, a Denver newcomer could connect with established figures 
of outside clubs and fraternities. Finally, a brief residence in Denver and 
a lack of fraternal ties did not necessarily imply a different motivational 
or value orientation. Joining the Klan reflected an attachment to the 
community, a desire to protect it. Protestants of diverse socioeconomic 
status and background reacted similarly to the Jewish bootlegger, the 
Italian drug-peddler, and the Jesuit priest.
Mass society theorists have also considered economic depression to be 
a causative factor in the development of social movements. Historians of 
the Klan have frequently linked the order’s emergence to the deep, but 
brief, depression that struck the United States in 1920. Economic hard 
times did not spawn the Denver organization. The Klan came to Denver 
in 1921, a year of financial collapse. All economic indicators pointed 
downward: farm prices and livestock receipts had declined, iron and 
coal production was curtailed, and the number of new business incorpo­
rations had fallen off. The Klan, however, was quiescent during the 
trough; its growth and political victories awaited the return of prosperity 
in 1923 and 1924. The Denver organization’s literature, recruiting appeals, 
and speakers rarely listed job competition or economic crimes among the
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charges leveled at Jews, Catholics, blacks, or immigrants. Moreover, the 
Klan’s first recruits tended to be the more economically and socially promi­
nent members of the society.23
Historian Jackson’s suggestion in The K u  Klux Klan in the City 
that residents in the “zone of emergence” were particularly susceptible to 
hooded appeals is not applicable to the Denver case. There was no distinct 
belt of contested neighborhoods in the city because minority expansion 
was irregular and sporadic. Eastern European Globeville and Little Jeru­
salem were spatially isolated and not perceived as disruptive of existing 
residential patterns. Further, Denver, except for the location of its black 
ghetto, does not fit the ethnic core-middle class rings model of many east­
ern cities. Thus, while the situational factor of neighborhood transition 
explains the motivation of some Klansmen, no visible pattern of Klan 
settlement emerges. Residentially there were four major pockets of Klans­
men— north Denver-Berkeley, the area between the Platte River and 
Cherry Creek, south Denver, and Capitol Hill. One-fifth of the late joiners 
and 14 percent of the early joiners lived in north Denver-Berkeley, a 
middle class neighborhood with small, single-family homes and well-kept 
lawns. The residents of the area, on the western boundary of Little Italy, 
were especially sensitive to the threat of immigrant encroachment. Another 
20 percent of the late joiners resided in the strip of land between the 
Platte River and Cherry Creek, a densely populated, run-down section of 
the city. Below Alameda Avenue, in south Denver, were the homes of 
13 percent of the early joiners and 17 percent of the later recruits. South 
Denver was a relatively new area, and like north Denver, populated by 
the middle class. Capitol Hill, between Seventh and Twentieth Avenues, 
housed one-third of the early joiners and 14 percent of the late joiners. 
More affluent than South Denver, Capitol Hill was a heterogeneous area 
of large mansions, small homes, and exclusive apartments. Other con­
centrations of Klansmen appeared in Park Hill, downtown Denver, and 
around the Five Points black ghetto. As expected, the sparsely settled 
areas east of Colorado Boulevard and west of the South Platte River 
produced few recruits. The residential distribution is further evidence of 
the Klan’s varied appeal. No neighborhood, whether wealthy, middle class, 
decaying, old, or new, was off limits to the klavern’s kleagles.24
23 “Changes in Economic Welfare, Denver and Colorado,” University of Denver 
Business Review3 III (January 1927), 21-22.
24 Jackson, Klan in the City, 244; William F. Christians, “Land Utilization in 
Denver” (doctoral dissertation, University of Chicago, 1938), 32-43, 48, 53-62, 73-80: 
F. L. Carmichael, “Housing in Denver.” University of Denver Business Review, XVII 
(June 1941), 10, 17, 19,22,42.
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Occupational differences between the two groups were considerable 
(Table 4). Early joiners engaged in high and middle nonmanual occupa­
tions comprised 51.5 percent of their group, while just 21 percent of the 
late joiners shared an equal status. At the same time, 43 percent of the 
late joiners labored in occupations below low nonmanual as compared to 
only 16.5 percent of the early joiners. Only in the low nonmanual category 
do the groups contain similar proportions of men. Within the early joiners 
sample, the most numerous occupations were: manager of a firm (54), 
small businessman (42), salesman (23), lawyer (17), office clerk (17), 
and physician (16). Salesman (48), small businessman (46), and office 
clerk (38) also predominated in late joiner ranks along with laborer (37), 
driver (25), and mechanic (20). These occupational differences were 
significant, with late joiners tending to hold fewer high status jobs than 
early joiners (gamma, -.56).
Table 4: Occupational Distribution of Denver Klansmen,
Denver, Colorado, 1921-1925, Compared with the Occupational 
Distribution of Denver’s Male Population in 1920
M a le
Occupational Early Joiners Late Joiners Populatioi
Status Group N Percent N Percent Percent
High Nonmanual 58 15.5 15 3 4.7
Middle Nonmanual 135 36.0 107 18 14.5
Low Nonmanual 76 20.3 140 24 22.3
Skilled 32 8.5 110 19 18
Semiskilled and
Service 28 7.5 102 17 21
Unskilled 2 .5 40 7 13.5
Unknown 44 11.7 69 12 6
Total 375 583
Source: Denver City Directory; Bureau of the Census, Fourteenth Census of the United 
States} Population, 1920: Occupations, IV, 1095-98.
The late joiners’ occupational distribution was a cross section of the 
wider Denver structure in all but the unskilled category. Conversely, high 
and middle nonmanual job holders among the early joiners are heavily 
overrepresented relative to the Denver population. When the two samples 
are united, the early joiners, skewed as a result of recruiting bias, disrupt 
the representative nature of the late joiners. In the combined Klan mem­
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bership, the high and middle nonmanual categories are overrepresented, 
the low nonmanual blocs equivalent, and all blue collar divisions under­
represented. Thus, a larger proportion of men in the upper occupational 
groups appeared in the Klan than in the outer environment. Semiskilled 
and unskilled workers were the least likely to share the secrets of the 
Invisible Empire. The numerical domination of clerical and blue collar 
workers in the Ku Klux Klan is, therefore, misleading. The Klan attract­
ed a greater number of men holding low nonmanual and manual jobs 
not because of the alleged intolerance or status anxiety of these groups, but 
rather due to the character of Denver’s economy. There were simply 
more Denverites in occupations below the midle nonmanual line than 
above it, and the Klan reflected this distribution. Hence, what at first 
glance seems to have been a movement of the lower middle and working 
classes was actually a wider-based organization — a somewhat distorted 
mirror image of the population encompassing all but the elite and un­
skilled. A comparison of Klansmen with white native-born males is im­
possible because the census does not classify occupations by ethnic and 
racial group.
The pre-Klan occupational mobility histories of 54 percent of the 
early members and 41 percent of the later arrivals were sun eyed. They 
reveal that before entering the Klan over half of the early joiners were 
nonmobile, one-third were upwardly mobile, and one-tenth downwardly 
mobile. Occupationally static late joiners formed 48 percent of their group, 
upwardly mobile 29 percent, and downwardly mobile 18 percent. There 
is little change in these percentages when occupations held as Klansmen 
are considered.
In light of the Klan’s initial recruiting techniques, it is not sur­
prising that the early joiners resembled the Denver leadership socially 
and economically. Klavern officers had first turned to their close friends, 
relatives, lodge brothers, and business associates when seeking men. There 
were no significant differences between the early joiners and the leaders 
as to age, number of fraternal ties, length and place of residence, or occu­
pational status. While similar to the late joiners in age and place of resi­
dence, leaders tended to have resided in Denver for longer periods and 
to hold more fraternal memberships. The leaders were far more likely to 
have high status occupations than the late joiners (gamma, .79).
Selective recruiting explains much of the socioeconomic variation 
between early and late joiners. Early joiners were contacted through re­
stricted lodge, business, and professional channels, while the late joiners 
were conscripted in a mass membership drive. The leaders and early joiners
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were economically and fraternally one step below Denver’s elite, while 
the late joiners closely approximated the outer society. Significant differ­
ences were observed in length of residence, number of fraternal ties, and 
occupational status. That is, early joiners tended to live in Denver for 
longer periods, belong to more lodges, and hold higher status jobs than 
late joiners. Diversity within the two blocs helped lessen intergroup dif­
ferences. A sizable bloc of early joiners had lived in the city only a short 
time before entering the Invisible Empire. Also, men in high and middle 
nonmanual occupations comprised 21 percent of the late joiner sample. 
Similarly, common life and generational experiences united the hetero­
geneous membership. The knights were mature men with families. The 
majority had roots in the farms and small towns of Colorado and the Mid­
west. Almost all had remained on the home front during World War I.
The men shared issue interests as well. The Klan’s complex appeal, 
rooted in a common Protestant identity and cache of symbols, was designed 
to attract men from every station on the socioeconomic spectrum. The 
result in Denver was a loose coalition of diffuse, unorganized camps dis­
tinguished by their particular needs and fears. Distinct groups are dis­
cernible although the mosaic is blurred, for few took out membership 
on the basis of a single feature of the Klan program. Aside from the 
opportunists, coerced, and faddists whose influence was minimal, several 
salient groupings can be identified. The Klan contained a small hard 
core of true believers eager to save the world from marauding Catholics, 
Jews, and blacks. An allied bloc, less steeped in the rhetoric of prejudice, 
reacted to immediate threats to their homes and neighborhoods. The 
lodge men found the mysteries of Kloranic ritual more satisfying than 
minority baiting. None of these groups alone or combined were sufficient 
to propel the movement to power. Success came only when the Klan 
merged their grievances with demands to restore law and order to Denver. 
Many of those concerned about the spreading lawlessness were not par­
ticularly bigoted. They tolerated the rabid passion of fellow Klansmen 
primarily because of their white Protestant heritage of distrust and the 
minority’s connection to crime. The Denver Klan’s law and order empha­
sis reflected its drawing strength and the needs of its membership. Klan 
leaders representing the different interests guaranteed, however, that no 
issue was neglected.
A conscious effort was made in this study to avoid the methodological 
weaknesses which have hindered the general acceptance of one thesis 
about Klan membership over another. Unlike other research concerning
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the rank and file, data were collected upon a variety of socioeconomic 
variables. Occupational status, while critical, was only one fragment of 
information composing a variegated portrait. Moreover, gross classifica­
tion of occupational information into monolithic white and blue collar 
categories was rejected for more precise and intellectually defensible 
divisions. Random sampling provided groups of Klansmen representative 
of the larger klavern membership. Comparisons to the general population 
were also undertaken to more fully explore the nature of the Klan 
phenomenon.
The Denver case supports the conception of a highly diversified 
membership. Excluding the elite and the unskilled, the Klan rank and file 
was a near occupational cross section of the local community. Modifica­
tions in recruiting methods and issue salience enabled any white Protestant, 
regardless of background, to find a home in the Invisible Empire. Denver’s 
early joiners were, as a group, prominent men holding high status occu­
pations and multiple fraternal memberships. The later arrival of men 
more closely resembling the general population did not precipitate a mass 
exodus of the first recruits. Resignation notations did not fill the member­
ship records because late joiners were welcomed as Klan voters and allies 
in internal factional batdes. Common generational experiences and back­
grounds also seemed to lessen disharmony. The young, the elite, and the 
proletariat were the only groups that could not be accommodated in the 
Invisible Empire.
Sheltering half of the state’s hooded population, the Denver organiza­
tion, was the center of Colorado Klandom. The Klan’s initial objective, 
Denver also had been the first Colorado community to fall under the 
sway of invisible government. The Denver Klan’s cafeteria of appeals, 
molded to time and local events, drew strength from governmental inaction 
and unresponsiveness. White Protestant men from all socioeconomic strata 
responded to the call to save their homes and community from disruptive 
groups. The credit for the Klan’s success rested with its able leaders, for 
they attracted and then held this heterogeneous membership together. 
They made it possible for the movement to be simultaneously an agency 
for law and order, a fraternal home, and for the newly arrived, a way 
station bedecked with the symbols of the small town. Operating in an 
atmosphere of tolerance and unhindered by opposition sniping, the Den­
ver Klan’s rise to power was swift.
